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INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND TORT LAW:
PARTNERS IN A UNIFIED THEORY OF CAUSATION
Barbara Ruth Moulyt
I. INTRODUCTION
The prospect of teaching intelligent design in a public school science
course will typically produce controversy in any community.' Parents,
t Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law.
1. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708-11 (M.D. Pa.
2005). The Kitzmiller decision is discussed infra Part II. Footnote 14, infra, contains a
quotation of the statement regarding intelligent design which gave rise to the controversy in
Kitzmiller. For examples of press coverage of the Kitzmiller case, see Lisa Anderson,
Intelligent Design Fails Federal Test; Judge's Ruling Called Landmark, THE RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), Dec 21, 2005, at A18, available at 2005 WLNR 20708891; Michael
Powell, Judge Rules Against "Intelligent Design": Dover, Pa., District Can't Teach
Evolution Alternative, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR
20804592.
See also Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
(vacated and remanded, 449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2006)) (controversy arose concerning
school district's requirement to place on biology textbooks a sticker proclaiming evolution to
be a theory, not fact). For examples of press coverage in various communities of the
teaching of intelligent design and other alternatives to evolution, see Bill to Promote
Intelligent Design Talk Fails, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 16, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
3039065 (defeat of bill that would have required that "no student in any public school...
shall be penalized ... because the student may subscribe to a particular position on scientific
theories"); James C. McKinley, Jr., Split Outcome in Texas Battle on Teaching of Evolution,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at Al 1, available at 2009 WLNR 1406654 (Texas Board of
Education's decision to end a 20-year policy requiring science teachers to "explore with
their students the 'strengths and weaknesses' of all theories," but adopting a specific
requirement that science teachers inform students concerning certain aspects of the fossil
record that do not support "the idea of species changing over time"); Will Sentell,
Creationism Ban Stripped from Rules, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Jan. 14, 2009, at Al,
available at 2009 WLNR 747047 (Louisiana Board of Education contemplating and
expected to approve regulations that would remove language prohibiting use of materials
that teach creationism or intelligent design); Peter Slevin, Kansas Education Board First To
Back "Intelligent Design": Schools To Teach Doubts About Evolutionary Theory, WASH.
POST, Nov. 9, 2005, at Al (indicating that state standards mention a "lack of adequate
natural explanations for the genetic code").
For examples of articles supporting and critiquing intelligent design theory, see Bob
Allen, Intelligent Design Renews Debate Between Science and Religion, THE
BAPTIST STANDARD, Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://www.baptiststandard.com/index.
php?option=comcontent&task=view&id--9132&temid=53; Dan Falk, A Pseudoscientific
Challenge to Evolutionary Theory-- "Intelligent Design "--Is Raising Questions About the
Origins of Life and Sparking Debate in Academia, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2001
(Magazine), at 16; Gregory S. Paul, Creationism in Denial, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at
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professional educators, and policy makers are some of the stakeholders with
strong and passionate interests in the matter. Courts of law and legal
scholars likely will become increasingly involved in resolving legal issues
pertaining to the teaching of intelligent design.
Intelligent design is a theory of causation in the natural sciences.
Essentially, its method employs a variant of probability theory. z This
method permits an inference that intelligent design produced an effect,
provided that the given effect has been observed to be "both complex and
specified.' '3 Intelligent design begins with observations of the complexity
of patterns and information in living organisms and their sub-systems, and
draws inferences from those observations based on the probabilities of their
characteristics having been produced randomly, on the one hand, or by
design, on the other hand.
Two of the proponents of intelligent design have described the
observation of such complexity and information in the living cell:
On its surface we find millions of openings, like portholes in a
ship. But these are not mere portholes. They regulate the flow
of materials in and out of the cell. Cells exhibit nano-
engineering on a scale and sophistication that scientists have
hardly begun to scratch....
Inside the cell we find a host of raw materials maneuvered
back and forth by robot-like machines all working in unison. In
fact, many different objects move in perfect unison through
seemingly endless conduits....
If we peer further inside the cell, we find coils of DNA that
store the information necessary to construct proteins. Proteins
themselves are remarkably complex molecular systems. A
typical protein is composed of a few hundred amino acids
arranged in a precisely ordered sequence that then folds into a
B5, available at 2001 WLNR 386834; Philip S. Skell, The Dangers of Overselling
Evolution, FORBES, Feb. 23, 2009; Robert M. Taylor, Science Can't Rule Out God's Role in
Creation of Life, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Nov. 9, 2001, at 2D, available at 2001
WLNR 11915001.
2. See WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE
AND THEOLOGY 130 (1999) ("Complexity ... here is a form of probability .... [T]o
determine whether something is sufficiently complex to warrant a design inference is to
determine whether it has sufficiently small probability [of occurring without design].").
3. Id. at 47; see also infra Part HI for a discussion of the requirements of complexity
and specification.
[Vol. 3:543
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highly organized three-dimensional structure. That structure
enables the protein to perform its function inside the cell.
4
Tort cause-in-fact theory, a significant and essential element of the
determination of liability for negligent and intentional acts, is a theory of
causation in the law. Its basic method permits an inference that an act
produced an injury, provided that there is sufficient evidence to allow a trier
of fact to conclude that, more likely than not, the injury would not have
happened without the act.5 The phrase "more likely than not" or "more
probable than not" is a requirement of evidentiary proof, known as the
"preponderance" (greater weight of the evidence) standard. Essentially, the
method of analysis of cause-in-fact in tort law also employs a form of
probability theory.6
Both of these theories, although operating independently in two separate
disciplines, make logical inferences about causation of past events from
data or evidence, based on certain rules or criteria. This Article argues that
the existence of a number of similarities between the two methods helps to
establish the validity of the intelligent design method as conforming to
well-established and time-tested reasoning.
The Article will describe and compare the methods of analysis employed
in these two disciplines: causation analysis in intelligent design theory and
causation analysis in tort theory, one from the discipline of science and one
from the discipline of law. As to intelligent design theory, the Article will
describe the irreducible complexity concept and the specified complexity
criterion. As to tort theory, it will describe and give examples of cause-in-
fact theory, a method that partakes of logic as well as common knowledge
and common sense, and that has been used for centuries in courts of law to
determine liability in tort cases. It will also briefly address the concept of
superseding intervening causes in the theory of proximate causation.
Further, it will integrate into the discussion the evidentiary doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur and the causation analysis included in that doctrine.
The Article will then compare the method of analysis in tort theory to the
method of analysis of intelligent design theory. It will note numerous
similarities between the two methods of analysis. It will argue that the
similarities demonstrate that intelligent design theory is an acceptable,
rigorous, and eminently reasonable method for determining causation.
4. WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI & SEAN McDOWELL, UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENT DESIGN
122 (2008).
5. See infra Part 1V for a discussion of tort causation theory.
6. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the preponderance standard and probability in
regard to proof of causation in tort theory.
2009]
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The Article does not address the constitutionality of teaching intelligent
design in public schools. Thus, it does not attempt to resolve the related
matter of whether intelligent design theory is religious for the sake of
addressing Establishment Clause challenges to intelligent design. Those
tasks have been undertaken ably by others. However, the Article addresses
the fact that the method of intelligent design theory is neutral as to
supernatural causes and does not presuppose supernatural or divine causes.
The Article argues that the integrity of the method of analysis employed in
intelligent design theory is not compromised if the method leads to the
ultimate conclusion that a supernatural agent produced a living organism or
a system within a living organism.
II. THE DEBATE OVER SUPERNATURAL CAUSATION
The validity of the method of intelligent design theory is an important
issue in the consideration of whether to teach the theory in science courses.
One approach to the validity of the method is to discount it entirely, based
on the idea that an inference of an intelligent cause necessarily means an
inference of a supernatural cause, and that allowance for supernatural
causes takes the method outside the realm of science. A second approach is
to permit open-ended inquiry into causes, not excluding supernatural causes
from the inquiry, and thus leave room for an inference of intelligent design
as a cause, even if the intelligent designer is presumed or supposed to be
supernatural.
The first approach was summarized succinctly in the opinion in
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,8 where the court stated,
"[intelligent design] violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by
invoking and permitting supernatural causation . . . .9 The second
7. See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, The Constitutionality of the Monkey Wrench:
Exploring the Case for Intelligent Design, 59 OKLA. L. REv. 527 (2006); Kent Greenawalt,
Establishing Religious Ideas: Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent Design, 17 NoTRE
DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 321 (2003); Anthony Kirwin, Toto, I've a Feeling We're
Still in Kansas? The Constitutionality of Intelligent Design and the 2005 Kansas Science
Education Standards, 7 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 657 (2006); Casey Luskin, Alternative
Viewpoints About Biological Origins as Taught in Public Schools, 47 J. CHURCH & ST. 583
(2005); Stephen L. Marshall, When May a State Require Teaching Alternatives to the Theory
of Evolution? Intelligent Design as a Test Case, 90 Ky. L.J. 743 (2002); Jay D. Wexler,
Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public
Schools, 56 VAND. L. REv. 751 (2003); T. Mark Moseley, Comment, Intelligent Design: A
Unique Perspective to the Origins Debate, 15 REGENT U. L. REv. 327 (2003).
8. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
9. Id. at 735.
[Vol. 3:543
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approach posits that excluding the supernatural as a cause actually hinders
scientific inquiry. For example, William Dembski states, "[n]aturalism [the
view that science should consider only natural causes] is the intellectual
pathology of our age. It artificially constricts the life of the mind ....
The validity of a theory should be distinguished from its plausibility. A
theory is valid if it is "well-grounded or justifiable: being at once relevant
and meaningful."" An argument is plausible if it is "appearing worthy of
belief."'12 In other words, validity has to do with the soundness of the
grounding of a theory; plausibility has to do with whether a line of
reasoning is apparently believable. If a theory is well-grounded in a sound
methodology, it arguably has sufficient validity to merit a place in a science
curriculum, regardless of whether it merely appears to be worthy of belief.
1 3
Kitzmiller involved a constitutional challenge to one school division's
policy to require a reference to intelligent design in a science curriculum.
The policy required teachers to read to students in a ninth-grade biology
class a statement mentioning intelligent design as an alternative to Darwin's
theory of evolution. 14 In its discussion, the Kitzmiller court undertook the
10. DEMBSKI,supra note 2, at 120.
11. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1304 (10th ed. 1997) (using as
example "a valid theory").
12. Id. at 892.
13. The court in Kitzmiller confused validity and plausibility when it expressed doubt as
to the "validity" of intelligent design theory, on the incorrect assumption that Michael Behe,
one of the most notable proponents of intelligent design, had stated that the validity of
intelligent design theory rests on a belief in God. The court first indicated that Behe had
claimed that "the plausibility of the argument for [intelligent design] depends upon the
extent to which one believes in the existence of God." See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at
720. The court then made a leap from Behe's statement about plausibility to its own
statement to the effect that no other theory of origins bases its validity on a belief in God,
without making any distinction between validity and plausibility.
14. The statement to be read was as follows:
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about
Darwin's Theory of Evolution and eventually to take a standardized test of
which evolution is a part. Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to
be tested as new evidence is discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the
Theory exist for which there is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-
tested explanation that unifies a broad range of observations. Intelligent
Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from Darwin's view.
The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available for students who might
be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent Design actually
involves. With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open
mind. The school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to individual
students and their families. As a Standards-driven district, class instruction
20091
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task of deciding whether intelligent design theory is science and concluded
that it was not science, at least partially if not largely on the ground that
intelligent design takes into account supernatural causes. 5 The court,
earlier in its opinion, had cited with approval case law to the effect that the
acknowledgment of supernatural causation takes a theory outside the realm
of science. The court there stated, "[intelligent design's] religious nature is
evident because it involves a supernatural designer. The courts in Edwards
and McLean expressly found that this characteristic removed creationism
,,1,6from the realm of science and made it a religious proposition. Thus, the
court in Kitzmiller adopted the view that a theory that involves, or even
declines to exclude, a supernatural designer, is religious and not scientific.
The court in Kitzmiller, in adhering to the view that any acknowledgment
of supernatural causation takes a theory outside the realm of science,
evidently assumed that a theory of causation in science must consider either
material causes or non-material (such as supernatural) causes, and that a
theory cannot consider both. This has not always been the view in
causation theory. Aristotle's theory of causation posited that there were
four causes of any phenomenon: material, efficient, formal, and final.'
7
focuses upon preparing students to achieve proficiency on Standards-based
assessments.
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 708-09.
15. Id. at 735-46. The court indicated:
[W]e will offer our conclusion on whether [intelligent design] is science not
just because it is essential to our holding that an Establishment Clause violation
has occurred in this case, but also in the hope that it may prevent the obvious
waste of judicial and other resources which would be occasioned by a
subsequent trial involving the precise question which is before us.
Id. at 735. It was not absolutely essential to undertake the task of reaching a conclusion as to
whether intelligent design constitutes science; the court could have decided the case simply
on the question of whether, under the first prong of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), there was a secular purpose to the school division's policy to require reference to
intelligent design.
16. Id. at 720 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1987); McLean v.
Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1265-66 (E.D. Ark. 1982)). The Supreme Court in
Edwards characterized the view that a "supernatural creator was responsible for the creation
of humankind" as a religious belief. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 592. The court in McLean had
found that creation science "is simply not science" because it depends upon "supernatural
intervention." McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1267.
17. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 123. The Aristotelian causes were rejected by Francis
Bacon in favor of an inductive method that eliminated supernatural explanations and
considered only natural explanations of events. See Anne Marie Lofaso, Does Changing the
Definition of Science Solve the Establishment Clause Problem: Doing an End-Run Around
the Constitution, 4 PIERCE L. REv. 219, 223-24 (2006). Charles Darwin is seen as a modem
scientist in that his theories consider only natural explanations for phenomena. Id. at 230.
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Applying Aristotle's four causes to an example, the statue of
Michelangelo's David, the material cause is the material of which the item
is made, that is, marble. The efficient cause is the activity that produced the
item, that is, the chiseling of the marble. The formal cause is the structure
of the item, that is, a representation of David. The final cause is the
purpose of the item, that is, a work of art intended to beautify its
surroundings.' 8 Aristotle's theory thus included two material causes-the
material and efficient causes-and two non-material ones-the formal and
the final causes. The reason for mentioning the Aristotelian causes is not to
recommend that they be brought back literally into scientific thinking, but
to suggest that science has not always limited its inquiry to material and
natural causes.
The common law legal tradition has something to offer to the debate
over the consideration of supernatural causes: a method of analysis as to
causation that is neutral as to whether a cause is natural and material or
supernatural and immaterial. The common law of torts contains an analysis
as to "cause-in-fact" which permits the trier of fact (whether judge or jury)
simply to infer from evidence presented that an event or act more likely
than not produced a result. The analysis focuses on the evidence of the
sequence of events and draws inferences based on that evidence.
The purpose of the "cause-in-fact" analysis is to determine whether a
human actor is responsible for a particular injury, and therefore its focus
generally is on causation of harm by human actors-intelligent, but not
supernatural, causes. Nevertheless, by focusing on the sequence of events
leading to an injury rather than on the characteristics of the causal agent, the
method shows neutrality toward the characteristics of the causal agent. If
the method were to lead to the conclusion that a supernatural agent caused
an injury, the integrity of the method would not be compromised.
III. A DESCRIPTION OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN THEORY
Intelligent design is a theory of causation in the natural sciences. One of
its well-known proponents, William Dembski, has described it as follows:
Within biology, intelligent design is a theory of biological
origins and development. Its fundamental claim is that
However, an argument has also been made to the effect that Darwin's theory of natural
selection actually takes into account all four Aristotelian causes. See Massimo Pigliucci,
Design Yes, Intelligent No: A Critique of Intelligent Design Theory and Neo-creationism,
SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, Sept. 2001, at 34, available at http://www.infidels.org/library/
modern/features/2000/pigliuccil .html.
18. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 123.
2009]
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intelligent causes are necessary to explain the complex,
information-rich structures of biology and that these causes are
empirically detectable. To say intelligent causes are empirically
detectable is to say there exist well-defined methods that on the
basis of observational features of the world are capable of
reliably distinguishing intelligent causes from undirected natural
causes. 19
Dembski has thus characterized intelligent design as a theory that uses a
methodology to reach conclusions based on empirical data. Dembski has
pointed out that design theory is not new,20 but that it has experienced a
"resurgence" because of the recent development of "precise methods for
discriminating intelligently from unintelligently caused objects.' He
indicates that such methods uncover "information,, 2 2 and that this
information "becomes a reliable indicator of intelligent causation . . ,23
He further states that intelligent design is "not the study of intelligent
causes per se but of informational pathways induced by intelligent
causes."24 Dembski emphasizes that "intelligent design presupposes neither
a creator nor miracles. Intelligent design is theologically minimalist. It
detects intelligence without speculating about the nature of the
intelligence. 25
The two primary concepts of the intelligent design method are
"irreducible complexity" and "specified complexity." The two are related,
as the second refines and tightens the analysis of the first. "Irreducible
complexity" was set forth and argued by biochemist Michael Behe in 1996
in Darwin's Black Box. 26 As summarized in a recent work by William
Dembski and Jonathan Wells, Behe's argument was not only that
Darwinian theory fails to explain the origin of complex molecules inside of
cells, but also that the complex molecules inside of cells must have come
about by design. 27 Both of these arguments were supported by Behe's
concept of irreducible complexity. Behe asserts that: "A functional system
19. Id. at 106.
20. Id. at 105.
21. Id. at 106.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 107.
25. Id.
26. MICHAEL BEHE, DARwiN's BLACK Box: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO
EVOLUTION 39 (1996).
27. WILLIAM DEMBSKI & JONATHAN WELLS, THE DESIGN OF LIFE: DISCOVERING SIGNS
OF INTELLIGENCE IN BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 146 (2008).
550 [Vol. 3:543
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is irreducibly complex if it contains a multipart subsystem (i.e., a set of two
or more interrelated parts) that cannot be simplified without destroying the
system's basic function.
28
One of the irreducibly complex biological systems that Behe studied and
described was the bacterial flagellum. Its complexity, as described by
Dembski and McDowell, is such that it cannot function if one of its parts is
missing:
[T]he flagellum is like an outboard motor that powers a boat
through the water. It spins a whip-like tail to propel certain
bacteria through their watery environments .... The flagellum
spins at many thousands of revolutions per minute (its motor can
reach 100,000 rpm) and can change its direction in a quarter
turn.
•.. [T]he flagellum has multiple interdependent parts that
are each necessary for its function. The intricate machinery of
the flagellum includes a rotor, a stator, 0-rings, bushings,
mounting disks, a drive shaft, a propeller, a hook joint for the
propeller, and an acid-powered motor. Not only are all these
multiple parts absolutely essential for the operation of the
flagellum, but its intricate machinery also requires the
coordinated interaction of roughly 30 proteins, which in turn
require about 20 proteins to direct their assembly. The absence
of any one of them would cause the flagellum to cease
functioning.29
Behe's inference that irreducible complexity cannot be explained by natural
selection was as follows:
An irreducibly complex system cannot be produced.., by slight
successive modifications of a precursor system, because any
precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing a part
is by definition nonfunctional .... Since natural selection can
only choose systems that are already working, then if a
biological system cannot be produced gradually it would have to
28. Id.
29. DEMBSKI & McDOWELL, supra note 4, at 142.
2009]
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arise as an integrated unit, in one fell swoop, for natural selection
to have anything to act on.3°
As Dembski explains, the complex proteins in systems such as the
bacterial flagellum are "beyond what natural selection can muster in a
single generation.,, 31 Then, if such a system could not have been produced
randomly by natural selection, a second logical inference from the evidence
of irreducible complexity is that the system was produced non-randomly,
by design. This inference does not begin with any presupposition about the
origin of the flagellum; it begins with evidence of the characteristics of the
flagellum and draws an inference from that evidence. Intelligent design is
properly characterized as a method that does not begin with
presuppositions, but begins with data.32
"Specified complexity" is a systematic criterion for justifying an
inference of intelligent design. Dembski summarizes this criterion as
follows: "[w]hen intelligent agents act, they leave behind a characteristic
trademark or signature known as specified complexity. By recognizing this
feature, we can distinguish intelligently designed objects from those that are
the result of unintelligent natural forces. 33 The criterion not only takes into
account the complexity of a system, but it also provides an "explanatory
filter" that sufficiently eliminates the possibilities that even a complex
system arose by "necessity" (the latter is also called "law") or by chance.34
For example, a complex rock formation could have arisen by chance. A
complex ice crystal arises by law or necessity, that is, the laws governing
the properties of water, and although those laws may have been designed,
the crystal itself is not designed in the sense that an engineer designs a
structure.35
The explanatory filter requires that three things be established in order to
infer design: contingency, complexity and specification.36 Dembski has
described the purpose of these three things as follows:
30. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 148 (quoting BEHE, supra note 26, at 39).
31. Id.
32. See Moseley, supra note 7, at 337 (quoting David K. DeWolf et al., Teaching the
Origins Controversy: Science, or Religion, or Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 39, 93).
33. DEMBSKI & McDOWELL, supra note 4, at 102.
34. Id. at 106 (citing WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN INFERENCE: ELIMINATING
CHANCE THROUGH SMALL PROBABILITIES 19, 36 (1998); WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN
REVOLUTION 88 (2004)).
35. Id. at 105-06.
36. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 128.
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Contingency ensures that the object in question is not the result
of an automatic and therefore unintelligent process [necessity or
law] that had no choice in its production. Complexity ensures
that the object is not so simple that it can readily be explained by
chance. Finally, specification ensures that the object exhibits the
type of pattern characteristic of intelligence. 7
The explanatory filter thus applies probability theory in a systematic way to
the observable data, in order to sufficiently eliminate other possible
explanations for the apparent design of a system, and to provide a basis for
a legitimate inference that the system was intelligently designed. The
method sufficiently eliminates law and chance as the cause, then infers
38design as the cause.
As the foregoing discussion shows, the writings of Michael Behe and
William Dembski together explicate the theory of intelligent design.
According to Behe, "irreducible complexity" constitutes evidence of
intelligent design. That is, if the observer takes note of a system of
interrelated parts, where removal of one part would destroy the system's
basic function, that system can be described as irreducibly complex. An
irreducibly complex system could not come about by slight successive
modifications of a hypothetical precursor system, because that precursor
system, missing at least one essential part, would be dysfunctional. It is a
logical inference, then, that an irreducibly complex system must have come
about by design.
Dembski's explanatory filter complements the irreducible complexity
concept. The explanatory filter is a path of analysis requiring the observer
systematically to eliminate chance and necessity as likely causes of a
complex system's existence or development. The filter then permits the
observer to analyze the pattern of complexity in the system, and if that
pattern of complexity exhibits certain characteristics of intelligence
(specified complexity), to infer design.
One writer has thus summarized intelligent design theory as follows:
[I]ntelligent design theorists have argued that many cases of
complex specified information in nature, of which irreducible
complexity is but one example, point to intelligent design. The
basic idea, an application of probability and statistical theory, is
37. Id.
38. See Moseley, supra note 7, at 336-37.
2009]
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that intelligent agency can be detected when an improbable (i.e.,
complex) outcome conforms to a pattern (i.e., specification).39
The propositions of a logical syllogism in intelligent design theory would
proceed as follows:
(1) High information content (or specified complexity) and
irreducible complexity constitute strong indicators or hallmarks
of past intelligent design.
(2) Biological systems have a high information content (or
specified complexity) and utilize subsystems that manifest
irreducible complexity.
(3) Naturalistic mechanisms or undirected causes do not suffice
to explain the origin of information (specified complexity) or
irreducible complexity.
(4) Therefore, [intelligent] design theory constitutes the best
explanation for the origin of information and irreducible
complexity in biological systems.40
Thus, specified complexity and irreducible complexity work together to
support an inference of design in biological systems. The exhibition of
characteristics of intelligence known as specified complexity, and the
existence of a type of complexity that could not be assembled by gradual
permutation (irreducible complexity), are the fundamental criteria, or rules,
of intelligent design theory.
IV. A DESCRIPTION OF TORT CAUSATION THEORY
In a cause of action for a tort, the plaintiff must show a connection
between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the injury that the plaintiff
suffered. The method of demonstrating such a connection is to prove that
the defendant's conduct was a "cause-in-fact" of the injury. The classic test
of cause-in-fact, known as the "but for" or "sine qua non" rule, is that "the
defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have
occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a
cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it.' '41 In
39. Buckles, supra note 7, at 535-36.
40. Moseley, supra note 7, at 352 (citing RONALD L. NUMBERS, THE CREATIONISTS: THE
EVOLUTION OF SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM 95 (1993)).
41. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984). For
classic discussions of cause-in-fact, see Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9
STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735
(1985); Paul J. Zwier, "Cause in Fact" in Tort Law-A Philosophical and Historical
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certain situations, as when the conduct of two actors combines to bring
about a harm and the conduct of either of them alone would have caused it,
the "but for" rule would unjustly excuse both actors. In such situations,
courts will apply a broader rule, the "substantial factor" rule, which states
that "the defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.4
2
The plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue of cause-in-fact, which
means that the plaintiff must persuade the trier of fact by a preponderance,
or the greater weight of the evidence, that the defendant's conduct caused
the plaintiffs injury. Thus, "plaintiff must introduce evidence which
affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not
that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. 43
Notably, the plaintiff does not have to eliminate all other possibilities for
the cause of the injury; the plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence
that the defendant's conduct was more likely than not a cause. The plaintiff
is not required to eliminate all "possibility that the defendant's conduct was
not a cause."" According to the Restatement:
It is enough that [plaintiff] introduces evidence from which
reasonable men may conclude that it is more probable that the
event was caused by the defendant than that it was not. The fact
of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since no man
can say with absolute certainty what would have occurred if the
defendant had acted otherwise.45
The trier of fact infers causation by examining the evidence in light of
the way things ordinarily happen in the observable world. One court
observed that: "Courts, in such matters, consider the natural and ordinary
course of events, and do not indulge in fanciful suppositions."" Further, it
is common knowledge as to how things ordinarily happen that generally
Examination, 31 DEPAUL L. REv. 769 (1982). For a treatment of causation generally, see
H.L.A. Hart and A. Honore, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
42. Id.; see, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920). Two fires, one
caused by the negligence of the defendant and one of unknown origin, merged and burned
plaintiff's property. Either fire alone would have burned the property. Defendant's fire was
found to be a cause of the damage under the "substantial factor" test. Given that the fire of
unknown origin was strong enough to burn the property, the defendant could have unfairly
escaped liability under the "but for" test by saying that the damage would have occurred
even without his negligence. Id.
43. KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 269.
44. Id.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. b (1965).
46. Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694, 697 (La. 1885).
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guides the inquiry into cause-in-fact. Keeton and Prosser explain that, "If
as a matter of ordinary experience a particular act or omission might be
expected, under the circumstances, to produce a particular result, and that
result in fact has followed, the conclusion may be permissible that the
causal relation exists. ' 47 Underlying the cause-in-fact inquiry, then, is an
understanding that laypersons serving as jurors are capable of making
inferences about causation based on how events usually happen. Richard
W. Wright further observes that:
An inference is based on some concept of how things generally
happen-that is, on causal generalizations. Causal
generalizations incorporate the belief that the cause is in some
sense necessary for the occurrence of the consequence. The but-
for test is simply the means by which we determine whether this
element of necessity exists in the particular case.48
Thus, laypersons, armed with an understanding of how events generally
happen, use a rule or test to decide what most likely happened in a
particular instance.
Where common knowledge is inadequate to reveal to the trier of fact the
way things ordinarily happen, expert testimony may supply that knowledge.
Tort principles of law dictate that: "Circumstantial evidence, expert
testimony, or common knowledge may provide a basis from which the
causal sequence may be inferred. ' 49 Thus, even when the knowledge
necessary to infer causation is beyond the ken of the trier of fact, that
knowledge may be supplied by appropriate expertise, and the trier of fact
may proceed with its task of drawing inferences from the available
evidence.
Tort law clearly acknowledges that in the proof of causation, post hoc
does not mean propter hoc, that is, the mere fact that one event follows
another event does not establish a cause-effect relationship between the two
events.50 Nevertheless, where the probabilities weigh in favor of causation,
the plaintiff's proof suffices. A Louisiana court summarized this principle
stating that:
Where the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the
chance of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally
leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have
47. KEETON ETAL., supra note 41, at 270.
48. Wright, supra note 41, at 1786.
49. KEETON ETAL., supra note 41, at 270 (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins, 186 So. 625 (Miss. 1939).
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happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the
chain of cause and effect between the negligence and the
injury. 51
This distinction between probability and possibility is the dividing line
between sufficient evidence and insufficient evidence of cause-in-fact.
Professor Malone observed that:
Whenever the judge has concluded that the showing on the issue
of cause is not sufficient to warrant a submission to the jury, he
is likely to emphasize that there is a sharp distinction between a
'mere possibility' and a showing of 'probability' or 'reasonable
probability.' The evidence must do more than leave the matter
'in equilibrio.'
52
Thus, the resolution of the issue of cause-in-fact in tort cases is integrally
related to probability. As the trier of fact weighs the evidence, the trier
must determine whether the evidence makes it more probable than not that,
without defendant's negligence, the plaintiff's injuries would not have
occurred.
Once cause-in fact is established, courts may limit liability by applying
the concept of "proximate cause" or "legal cause." "Proximate cause" has
to do with "setting the limits beyond which the courts will not look in the
attempt to trace the connection between a given cause and a given effect."53
Two theories of proximate causation have developed. One is that liability
is limited to the scope of foreseeable risks. The other is that liability is
limited to direct consequences of an action, as well as to indirect
consequences that are foreseeable.54 The basic principle of proximate
51. Reynolds, 37 La. Ann. at 697.
52. Malone, supra note 41, at 68.
53. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Daniels, 70 S.E. 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911). A typical
jury instruction on causation combines the "but for" concept of cause-in-fact with language
that conveys the concept of the proximate cause limitation on liability for remote or
unforeseeable consequences. See, e.g., VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIO NS (LexisNexis 2008),
Instruction 5.000, "Definition of Proximate Cause" ("A proximate cause of an accident,
injury, or damage is a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the
accident, injury, or damage. It is a cause without which the accident, injury, or damage
would not have occurred."). For classic discussions of proximate cause, see Bohlen, The
Probable or the Natural Consequences as a Test of Liability in Negligence, 40 U. PA. L.
REV. 79 (1901); see also Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39
YALE L.J. 532 (1930); Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. REv. 103 (1911).
54. KEETON ETAL., supra note 41, at 273.
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causation is that actors are not liable for every conceivable and perhaps
remote result of their actions-a principle of fairness and common sense.
One rule of proximate causation is that of the superseding intervening
cause. An intervening cause is a new and somewhat independent force that
comes into operation after the negligence of the defendant and contributes
along with defendant's negligence to produce the result.55 The intervening
cause does not relieve the defendant of liability if it is "foreseeable," that is,
if it is "a significant part of the risk involved in the defendant's conduct, or
is so reasonably connected with it that the responsibility should not be
terminated.
5 6
An intervening cause is identified as a superseding intervening cause,
which relieves the defendant of responsibility, where it is unforeseeable or
outside the risk created by the defendant. Courts consider a number of
factors in determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause;
among them are the fact that the intervention brings about harm different in
kind from that expected by the defendant's negligence, the fact that the
intervention is extraordinary, and the fact that the intervention is operating
independently of the situation created by the defendant's negligence.57
A special example of intervening cause analysis occurs with regard to an
extraordinary force of nature that comes into operation after the defendant's
conduct. Tort law distinguishes between forces that merely increase or
intensify the expected results of defendant's conduct and forces that are
somewhat more independent of defendant's conduct. As to the former, the
Restatement indicates that "[t]he extraordinary operation of a force of
nature, which merely increases or accelerates harm to another which would
otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligent conduct, does not
prevent the actor from being liable for such harm."58 As to the latter, the
Restatement indicates that:
[a]n intervening operation of a force of nature without which the
other's harm would not have resulted from the actor's negligent
55. Id. at 301.
56. Id. at 302; see, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. 3 Oaks Wrecking and Lumber Co., 382 N.E.
2d 283 (I11. App. Ct. 1978) (after failure to secure a condemned house, vagrants entered and
started fire); Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co. 104 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939) (after mislabeling of
water, the water was mixed with sodium and caused explosion).
57. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 442 (1965); see, e.g., Watson v. Kentucky &
Indiana Bridge & R.R. Co., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910) (after negligent spilling of gasoline
from tank car, bystander threw lighted match into gasoline vapor, allegedly with intent to
start fire).
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, § 450; see, e.g., Kimble v. Mackintosh Hemphill Co.,
59 A.2d 68 (Pa. 1948).
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conduct prevents the actor from being liable for the harm, if (a)
the operation of the force of nature is extraordinary, and (b) the
harm resulting from it is of a kind different from that the
likelihood of which made the actor's conduct negligent.
59
The tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself")
contains a rule of circumstantial evidence permitting an inference of
negligence from the mere occurrence of an event, provided that certain
requirements are met. The requirements are: (1) the event that occurred
has the characteristics of an event that ordinarily does not happen without
negligence; (2) the instrumentality that caused the event was under the
control (or management) of the defendant; and (3) other potential causes,
such as the negligence of the plaintiff, are reasonably eliminated.6 The
considerations of causation implicit in the first and third of these
requirements bring this doctrine within a discussion of the inferences of
causation made in tort law.
V. COMPARISONS BETWEEN INTELLIGENT DESIGN THEORY
AND TORT THEORY
The analytical process in intelligent design theory is similar to that in tort
causation theory in that inferences are made about causes using certain
rules of logic. 61 In both methods of analysis, the form of analysis is neutral
as to possible causes and does not specifically exclude supernatural
causes. 62 In intelligent design theory, one may infer the existence of an
intelligent designer of an organism where there is sufficient evidence of
irreducible complexity in the organism, or where the organism stores and
passes on significant or detailed information.63 In tort causation theory, one
may infer that an event, such as the negligence of an actor, caused a harm
59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, § 451. Courts historically have used the term "act of
God" for an extraordinary force of nature which may prevent the original negligent actor
from being liable. See, e.g., McWilliams v Masterson, 112 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App. 2003).
60. KEETON ETAL., supra note 41, at 244-50.
61. DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra note 27, at 160 (arguing that intelligent design can be
logically inferred from irreducible complexity).
62. See DEMBSKI & McDOWELL, supra note 4, at 46 (stating that intelligent design does
not require any particular designer); KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 264 (stating that tort
law, in order to impose legal responsibility, narrows the inquiry from a philosophically
unlimited number of causes that "go back to the dawn of human events"; thus, tort law
implicitly makes no assumptions relative to causation).
63. See DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 107; see also supra Part III.
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where there is sufficient evidence that "but for" that event, the harm would
not have occurred. 64
Intelligent design theory looks at what has happened (the existence of an
organism with certain characteristics) and asks whether it could have been
65produced absent an intelligent designer. Tort causation theory, using the
"but for" test, looks at what has happened and compares it to what would
have happened if the defendant had not been negligent.66 In this sense, the
reasoning process in intelligent design theory is closely akin to the "but for"
test in tort causation theory. Both theories examine a past event and
determine whether it could have occurred without a certain antecedent act.
Both theories use a test or rule to eliminate causes and to determine the
likelihood that a particular act produced a given result.
A. Probability Theory Controls the Drawing of Inferences in Both
Methods of Analysis
In intelligent design theory, the more irreducible complexity there is in
the structure of an organism, the more probable it becomes that it was
intelligently designed, and the less probable it becomes that it came about
by chance.67 Further, the more complex and detailed are the information
pathways in an organism, the more probable it becomes that it was
intelligently designed, and the less probable it becomes that it happened by
chance.68
The explanatory filter of the specified complexity criterion forces the
investigator to sufficiently eliminate one by one the possible explanations
for the existence of a living organism or system, other than design. If the
other explanations are not sufficiently eliminated, the analysis stops. 69 The
filter thus is a meaningful way to sort out and eliminate putative causes that
64. KEETON ETAL., supra note 41, at 266.
65. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 106-07 (arguing that intelligent design is necessary to
explain complexity, and that intelligent causes are empirically detectable).
66. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 141 (2d
ed., Aspen 2000).
67. DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra note 27, at 160 (arguing that Darwinian pathways cannot
explain complexity in causation, but intelligent design can). See the discussion of the
explanatory filter, supra Part III and notes 36-38.
68. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 160-61 (arguing that even if Darwinian "chance" can
explain transmission of information between organisms, it cannot explain the origin of
information).
69. DEMBSKI & McDOWELL, supra note 4, at 106 (noting that both chance and necessity
must be eliminated as causes before the inference of design may be made).
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may appear to have a causal connection with an event but do not actually
have such a connection.
First, at the contingency step of the analysis, the investigator must
sufficiently eliminate the likelihood that the organism or system came about
by an automatic and therefore unintelligent process (necessity).70 Second,
at the complexity step of the analysis, the investigator must sufficiently
eliminate the likelihood that the organism came about by chance. 71 Third, at
the specification step of the analysis, the investigator must be able to say
that the object exhibits the type of pattern characteristic of intelligence.7
Once these steps are satisfied, the best explanation for the organism's
characteristics is design.73
The above three-step analysis of the specified complexity criterion
requires that the data satisfy a strict standard in order to reach a conclusion
of intelligent design. Once the specified complexity criterion is satisfied,
the evidence (or data) weighs heavily in favor of the design inference, and it
is highly probable that the organism was intelligently designed.74 The
explanatory filter, therefore, systematically examines and eliminates
putative causes in intelligent design theory.
In causation theory, in the proof of "cause-in-fact," the stronger the
connection between an act and a harm, the more probable it becomes that
the act was a cause of the harm. 75 The more compelling the evidence that
"but for" the act the harm would not have occurred, or in certain types of
cases that the act was a "substantial factor" in producing the harm, the more
probable it becomes that the act was a cause of the harm.7 6 If the trier of
fact (judge or jury) can say that it is more probable than not (or more likely
than not) that the act caused the harm, then the trier of fact is justifiably
70. Id. at 107 (referring to a description of the explanatory filter as applied to the
opening of a bank safe, and the statistical probabilities of its being opened by chance as
opposed to being opened by an intelligent actor); see also supra Part III and notes 33-38
(discussing the specified complexity and the explanatory filter).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. In contrast, Charles Darwin rested his theory on possibilities, rather than
probabilities. Darwin stated, "If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed,
which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications,
my theory would absolutely break down." ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 189 (Gryphon Edition
1987) (1859) (in the context of Darwin's discussion of the organ of the eye).
75. KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 269 (stating that possibility is not enough; rather,
proof of causation requires introduction of sufficient evidence to create probability).
76. Id. at 267 (stating that if an action is both a "material element" and a "substantial
factor," causation may be proved).
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persuaded that the act was a cause-in-fact of the harm.7 7 This requirement
that the proof show that the causal connection is more probable than not is
integrally related to the standard of proof in a civil case: the trier of fact
must be persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence, that is, the greater
weight of the evidence.78
In determining whether it is more likely than not that a negligent act
caused a harm, courts weigh the evidence in the light of generally known
facts as to how things happen, such as generally known principles of force
and speed. For example, where a train and car collided at a railroad
crossing, and the train's engineer had been negligent in driving at thirty-
seven miles per hour instead of twenty-five miles per hour, the survivors of
the passenger who was killed in the collision failed to prove cause-in-fact
under the "but for" test.
79
The evidence was that, as the train approached the intersection, its
brakeman and fireman saw the car emerge from behind a warehouse, which
blocked the view, and that they immediately alerted the engineer, who
applied the brakes. The train struck the automobile and carried it
approximately 1250 feet beyond the crossing. The train was very close to
the crossing at the moment when the car was sighted (between thirty and
sixty feet).80 Although no evidence was given of typical stopping distances
at various speeds, the evidence that the train carried the car well beyond the
crossing tended to show that the train could not have stopped before
reaching the crossing even at twenty-five miles per hour. 8' The plaintiff
could not show that it was more probable than not that, "but for" the train's
excessive speed, the train would not have struck the car and the passenger
would not have died.82 The "but for" test, with the preponderance standard
underlying it, thus operated in Perkins as a filter to eliminate a negligent act
as a cause of an event.
77. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Boulder Colo. Sanitarium Ass'n, 111 P.2d 633, 634 (Colo.
1941) (evidence must show "probability"; "possibility" is not sufficient); Lippold v. Kidd,
269 P. 210, 215 (Or. 1928) (in cases of doubt as to which of several probable causes
produced a harm, the case should be submitted to the jury for their determination of the
question).
78. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995);
Lasha v. Olin, 625 So. 2d 1002, 1005 (La. 1993) (proof by direct or circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to constitute preponderance when, taking evidence as a whole, such proof shows
that fact of causation sought to be proved is more probable than not); Friedman v. General
Motors Corp., 331 N.E.2d 702 (Ohio 1975).
79. Perkins v. Tex. and New Orleans Ry. Co., 147 So. 2d 646, 649 (La. 1962).
80. Id. at 647.
81. Id. at 649.
82. Id.
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Thus, the explanatory filter of intelligent design analysis and the "but
for" test of tort causation analysis each provide a meaningful way in their
respective disciplines to sort out and eliminate putative causes that may
appear to have a causal connection with an event, but do not actually have
such a connection.
The "substantial factor" test has been used to narrow the field of putative
causes in cases in which the absence of reasonably expected medical care
significantly lessened a plaintiff's decedent's chance of survival. Thus,
when after negligent delay in treatment in a hospital emergency room
decedent perished from a heart attack, and medical testimony was to the
effect that decedent would have had a seventy-five percent chance of
survival if the delay had not occurred, the court found that the negligence of
emergency room personnel was a substantial factor in the decedent's
death. 3 A negligent delay in diagnosis of lung cancer that reduced a
decedent's chance of survival was a substantial factor in producing losses
related to the reduced chance of survival.84
Such cases are closely related to another factual situation, in which a
decedent perished by drowning in the absence of an expected protective
precaution.85 In these cases, the failure to treat, failure to diagnose, or
failure to provide protection becomes a cause-in-fact when the failure
sufficiently decreases chance of survival, because other conditions that
might have produced death are sufficiently eliminated as likely causes.
Although such cases elude mathematical certainty, courts are able to
apply causation theory to more difficult causation inquiries such as these,
where the tools of analysis legitimately narrow the field. Similarly, in
intelligent design theory, scientists are able to apply the tools of irreducible
complexity and specified complexity to narrow sufficiently the field of
putative causes, by systematically eliminating the inferences other than
design.
When tort causation theory is applied to scientific evidence of the effects
of drugs and toxic substances, the "more probable than not" requirement
may be expressed as a statistical standard. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court determined that epidemiological evidence
of the incidence of birth defects in children exposed in utero to Bendectin
would not suffice to prove cause-in-fact. 86  The evidence failed to
83. Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1283, 1285 (Pa. 1978).
84. Herskovitz v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474,476 (Wash. 1983).
85. Zinnel v. U.S. Shipping Bd., 10 F.2d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1925) (seaman was washed
overboard in absence of ship guard rope).
86. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1995).
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demonstrate that there was a greater than 2:1 incidence of birth defects in
the children exposed to the drug than in the general population.17 A ratio of
greater than 2:1 would have made it more probable than not that Bendectin
caused the birth defects in those who ingested it.88
Tort theory is well suited to inquiries involving statistical evidence. The
preponderance standard adapts flexibly to numerical expressions of "more
probable than not." Similarly, intelligent design theory, which is a type of
probability theory, is well-suited to the use of statistical data and numerical
expressions to analyze causation questions in regard to biological systems.8 9
B. Human Experience as to What Ordinarily Supports an Inference of
Causation is Part of the Knowledge Base of Both Methods of Reasoning
A guiding principle in the drawing of inferences in legal reasoning
generally is that the logical connection between a known fact and a
conclusion is supported by human experience. As a text on logic in the law
observes, "The key to a logical inference is the reasonable probability that
the conclusion flows from the evidentiary datum because of past
experiences in human affairs." 90
In the determination of cause-in-fact in tort cases, the trier of fact reasons
from a knowledge base which includes common knowledge as to the way
things ordinarily happen. For example, where a railroad company
negligently failed to provide a lighted stairway for passengers to exit from
the train in darkness and a passenger fell attempting to descend the
unlighted stairway, the court was not persuaded by an argument to the
effect that the passenger, a "corpulent woman," might have fallen even if it
had been daylight.9' The court, in concluding that the negligent failure to
provide a lighted stairway was the cause of the fall, stated:
Where the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the
chances of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally
leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have
87. Id. at 1319. The court also addressed the reliability prong of the U.S. Supreme
Court's test set down in Daubert and found the epidemiological evidence inadmissible under
that prong as well. Id. at 1317-19 (discussing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993)).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., the discussion of "Specified Complexity" in DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra
note 27, at 165-203.
90. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING
27 (1997).
91. Reynolds v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694, 697 (La. 1885).
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happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the
chain of cause and effect between the negligence and the
injury.
92
The court concluded with a statement evincing the practicality of the
causation inquiry in tort law: "The whole tendency of the evidence connects
the accident with the negligence.
93
When the knowledge base of the trier of fact in a tort case does not
include specialized information that is necessary for a determination of
causation, as in a case of medical malpractice, tort law utilizes expert
testimony to provide the requisite specialized information, so that the trier
of fact can make the proper inference about causation.94 In other words, the
expert testimony raises the lay persons' knowledge to the level needed for
the factual determination of causation.
Similarly, intelligent design theory draws on common human experience
as to what constitutes a rational basis for making an inference of design.
William Dembski asserts that "[i]ntelligent design formalizes and makes
precise something we do all the time. All of us are all the time engaged in a
form of rational activity which . . . can be described as 'inferring design.'"95
In intelligent design theory, when the knowledge base of the student of
natural science does not include enough information to reach a conclusion
about causation, scientists with expertise in biological systems can give
evidence as to the detailed complexity in an organism. 96 Experts trained in
probability theory can provide evidence as to the likelihood of an
organism's having a certain identifiable level of complexity purely by
random natural processes, and the likelihood, in the alternative, that the
level of complexity is attributable to intelligent design.97 At that point, the
student of natural science should have the level of knowledge needed to
make inferences about causation.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Boyce v. Brown, 77 P.2d 455, 457 (Ariz. 1938); Turney v. Anspaugh, 581
P.2d 1301, 1308 (Okla. 1978).
95. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 48.
96. See DEMBSKI & McDOWELL, supra note 4, at 102 (arguing that intelligent design is
logically inferred from complexity). The scientist who is knowledgeable about biological
systems thus functions in a role similar to that of an expert witness in that the scientist can
raise the level of knowledge of the student of natural science, so that the student can make
proper inferences about causation.
97. See DEMBsKI & WELLS, supra note 27, at 168.
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C. Both Methods of Reasoning Are Able To Tolerate Some Measure of
Uncertainty as Long as the Inquirer Does Not Compromise the Rules of
Logic That Govern the Inquiry
Tort causation theory does not aim for complete certainty in assigning
responsibility for a harm. As Professor Glannon observes, "Although we
can never achieve certainty about cause in fact, the jury can usually make a
reasoned judgment as to whether the negligence contributed to the
outcome. 98 The preponderance standard, permitting the trier of fact to be
persuaded by the greater weight of the evidence, contains by definition an
allowance for some uncertainty. 99 There is in tort causation theory,
therefore, a tolerance of some unresolvable uncertainty as long as rules of
logic are applied. In scientific theory as well, there is tolerance of
necessary uncertainty as long as rules of reasoning are consistently applied.
Intelligent design theory permits an inference of design where the inquirer
detects irreducible complexity and/or informational pathways. 00 It does
not require absolute certainty as to its conclusion. Nor does natural science,
generally. Where science is investigating the origin and development of
living organisms, it presumably cannot aim for complete certainty, as there
is no direct evidence available as to the causes of this origin and
development.
D. Both Theories Allow For and Explain the Intervention of Extraordinary
Causes in a Sequence of Events That May Contain Less Extraordinary
Causes
In a tort case, an extraordinary force of nature, also referred to as an "act
of God," may arise unexpectedly and intervene in a situation already
created by a human actor's negligence.' ' Tort law has developed rules to
determine the effect of the extraordinary force of nature on the liability of
the human actor.10 2 Restatement Section 451 provides that:
98. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 144 (2d
ed. 2000).
99. KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 269-70 (noting that mathematical certainty is
seldom possible, and thus evidence sufficient to establish probability is enough).
100. DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra note 27, at 160.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 451 (1965).
102. See supra Part IV (discussing the rules of intervening cause); see also Bowman v.
Columbia Tel. Co., 179 A.2d 197, 202 (Pa. 1962); Kimble v. Mackintosh Hemphill Co., 59
A.2d 68, 71-72 (Pa. 1948) (collecting cases citing various rules of tort law); McWilliams v.
Masterson, 112 S.W.3d 314, 320 (Tex. App. 2003).
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[a]n intervening operation of a force of nature without which the
other's harm would not have resulted from the actor's negligent
conduct prevents the actor from being liable for the harm, if (a)
the operation of the force of nature is extraordinary, and (b) the
harm resulting from it is of a kind different from that the
likelihood of which made the actor's conduct negligent.103
The logic of the "different harm" requirement in Restatement 451 is that
the occurrence of a harm different in kind from that threatened by the
original actor's negligence must mean that the extraordinary force of nature
took over the chain of events and altered the events in a very significant
way, and that this alteration should relieve the original actor of liability.'0
4
Even though the harm would not have occurred "but for" the original
actor's negligence and that negligence is therefore a "cause-in-fact" of the
harm, the original actor's negligence is not the proximate cause of the harm
and therefore the original actor is not responsible. 0 5
The rule of Section 451, relieving the human actor where an
extraordinary force of nature has produced a different kind of harm and thus
has taken over the chain of events, is helpful in understanding intelligent
design theory, where "intelligent causes are necessary to explain the
complex, information-rich structures of biology.' '0 6 Just as evidence in a
tort case may show that an extraordinary force of nature took over a
sequence of events that was begun by human activity, so also evidence of
irreducible complexity and informational pathways in an organism may
show that the activity of an intelligent designer was part of a sequence of
events in which there were also natural causes, and may even show that the
intelligent designer became the operative cause of an organism's existence
and characteristics.
10 7
E. The Tort Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, a Rule of Circumstantial
Evidence Pertaining to the Proof of Negligence, Contains Reasoning
Similar to That of Intelligent Design Theory
Res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself") is a rule of circumstantial
evidence, allowing a jury to infer negligence from the circumstances of an
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 451 (1965).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 106.
107. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 46 (stating that in the pre-modem view, natural causes
constituted only part of the explanation for events in the world, "intelligent causes had free
play in the world as well," and "natural and intelligent causes operate in tandem").
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injury-causing event.108 In an early well-known case, a barrel of flour fell
from a window above the defendant's shop (the defendant being a dealer in
flour), injuring the plaintiff.'0 9 There was no evidence specifically to
connect the defendant or the defendant's employees with the barrel of
flour."0 The court, in ruling for the plaintiff, used the principle that the
accident itself (the falling of the flour barrel) was evidence of negligence."'
The court reasoned that a barrel does not roll out of a warehouse without
some negligence, and further, that the barrel was in the custody of the
defendant and the defendant's servants had control of the barrel."
12
Following the reasoning of Byrne v. Boadle, courts have developed a test
for determining whether a negligence case may be submitted to a jury with
a res ipsa loquitur instruction, allowing the jury to infer negligence from the
event itself, absent any other evidence of negligence. The test has been
stated as follows:
[W]here the thing [causing injury] is shewn to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that
the accident arose from want of care."
13
The phrase "the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if" bespeaks a species of causation analysis.
Similarly, in intelligent design theory, the inquirer observes and studies a
living organism. When the inquirer detects a high level of irreducible
complexity and/or a system for storing and transferring information, the
inquirer reasons that these characteristics do not ordinarily occur absent an
intelligent designer.' 14 This reasoning closely resembles analysis under the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, in which a court reasons that an occurrence is the
108. Jesionowski v. Boston & M.R.R., 329 U.S. 452, 457 (1947).
109. Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
110. Id. at 301.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 159 Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (1865); see
also Simpson v. Gray Line Co., 358 P.2d 516, 517 (Or. 1961); Sullivan v. Crabtree, 258
S.W.2d 782, 783-84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953).
114. DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra note 27, at 160 (arguing that naturalistic Darwinian
pathways are inadequate to explain complexity; intelligent design, however, provides the
explanation).
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type of event that does not ordinarily occur without negligence. 5 The
design inquirer will also consider whether random natural sequences can be
sufficiently eliminated as causes, using probability theory. 1 6 The latter part
of the inquirer's reasoning in intelligent design analysis closely resembles
the analysis under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, which requires that other
responsible causes be sufficiently eliminated by the evidence 
17
F. Both Theories Are Neutral as to Whether a Cause Is Natural or
Supernatural
Intelligent design theory simply has criteria from which a legitimate
inference of "intelligent design" can be made. It does not start with any
assumption about intelligent design; rather, it starts each inquiry with
observations and data." 8  Buckles argues that intelligent design is
"consistent with nonexclusionary methodological naturalism."" 9  He
explains further:
[N]onexclusionary methodological naturalism is committed only
to the assumption that a natural explanation may explain a given
natural phenomenon. As scientific inquiry proceeds, along the
way the evidence may suggest that a nonnatural explanation
better accounts for a natural phenomenon than a purely
naturalistic explanation. It is at this point that intelligent design
theorists are free to make their case. Intelligent design can be
understood as the articulation of the inference of a nonnatural
explanation for scientific evidence gathered through the
scientific process guided by nonexclusionary methodological
naturalism. In other words, intelligent design can be understood
as one "inferential phase" in the long process of scientific
inquiry. Because the scientific inquiry is committed to
nonexclusionary methodological naturalism, intelligent design is
115. KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 244-45 (events such as bricks or window panes
falling from defendant's premises, collapse of structures, live stock loose on the highway,
explosion of boilers, sudden starting of machinery give rise to inference that someone was
negligent).
116. DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra note 27, at 168 ("the greater the complexity, the smaller
the probability" in regard to the opening of a combination lock).
117. Toney v. U.S. ex rel U.S. Dept. of Army, 273 Fed. App'x 384, 386 (5th Cir. 2008)
(holding that res ipsa loquitur allows defendant's negligence to be established by
circumstantial evidence when other possibilities are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence).
118. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 248-49.
119. Buckles, supra note 7, at 577.
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not necessarily the final phase of the process. New evidence may
later surface to negate the inference that a natural cause alone
cannot plausibly explain the researched phenomenon. 1
20
Tort law has criteria from which inferences about causation can be made.
It does not start with any assumption about the identity of a cause of a
harm. Rather, it starts its inquiry with the available evidence. 2' The
purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether the defendant named in the
complaint is the cause of the harm alleged; therefore, its focus is generally
on the conduct of human actors. 12 2 But, because it allows for extraordinary
forces of nature as possible causes, it makes room for non-human causes
along the way in its inquiry. 23 If the evidence were to point to a non-
natural cause, there would be nothing in the method of reasoning to prevent
that inference.
VI. APPLICATIONS OF THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN TORT THEORY AND
INTELLIGENT DESIGN THEORY: INTELLIGENT DESIGN EMPLOYS A TIME-
TESTED METHOD
Tort rules of cause-in-fact have been refined over many centuries by
judges and juries. The rules, which provide a method for inferring factual
causation, are well-grounded in common sense and logic. They have stood
the test of time. As such, these rules may provide a universal form of
reasoning as to causation that would be helpful in any discipline, including
the natural sciences. Tort rules on proximate causation, such as the rules
for intervening forces of nature, demonstrate that extraordinary forces of
nature may supersede human negligence as legal causes.1 24 Other tort rules,
such as the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, demonstrate that it is acceptable to
draw inferences based on strong circumstantial evidence. 1
25
Intelligent design analysis, although it is a relatively new science,
follows much the same form of reasoning as does traditional tort law, that
120. Id. at 577-78.
121. KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 242 (noting that negligence is never presumed;
sufficient evidence must be produced to render the negligence more likely than not the cause
of the injury).
122. Id. at 173-74 (tort law compares conduct of human actors to the standard of the
reasonable person).
123. Id. at 315 (unforeseeable "acts of God" have long been considered to break the link
between negligence and causation).
124. See supra note 102 (listing various cases which contain basic torts rules stating that
"acts of God" (or "force majeure") can in some cases be a more proximate cause than human
agents).
125. See Jesionowski v. Boston & M.R.R., 329 U.S. 452,457 (1947).
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is, drawing inferences about causation from empirical evidence using rules
that clearly define what constitutes acceptable empirical evidence
(irreducible complexity and informational pathways). 126 Thus, intelligent
design may have already passed muster by conforming to a well-established
method of reasoning.
Furthermore, juries for centuries have decided the issue of causation in
the law by weighing the evidence in light of the preponderance standard.
Students and proponents of intelligent design make inferences about
causation in science by the use of an explanatory filter-a strict method of
eliminating alternate possible causes of complexity. The explanatory filter
can be viewed as intelligent design's method for weighing the evidence. Its
rigor compares well to the preponderance standard used in tort law. This
favorable comparison also bolsters the worthiness and credibility of the
methodology of intelligent design.
VII. AN ANALOGY TO TORT CAUSATION THEORY EXPOSES ONE OF THE
WEAKNESSES OF THE PRIMARY COMPETITOR OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN,
NATURALISTIC EVOLUTION
Dembski, in a critique of scientific naturalism, and specifically its
insistence that "science" does not and should not consider any causes
except natural and material ones, labels its reasoning as "circular" or
"begging the question."' 27 Dembski describes the path of reasoning of
naturalistic thinkers as follows:
(1) "Science" by definition excludes everything except the
material and the natural;
(2) This exclusion rules out intelligent design as a scientific
theory;
(3) This exclusion then ensures that the answer to the question
"how did life originate and develop?" will be answered
solely naturalistically;
(4) Thus, naturalistic evolution is the only logical answer to the
question of how life originated and developed, even if the
evidence in support of it is weak. 1
28
126. DEMBSKI & WELLS, supra note 27, at 160 (irreducible complexity); DEMBSKI, supra
note 2, at 107 (informational pathways and irreducible complexity).
127. DEMBSKI, supra note 2, at 119.
128. Id. at 117-19.
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The exclusion of a set of possible causes, if applied to the analysis of a
causation question in tort law, could radically affect the outcome of tort
lawsuits in an absurd way.
Consider a hypothetical, but typical, tort causation question. Driver,
driving an automobile, saw a child in the street ahead of him. Driver did
not apply the brakes. Driver's automobile struck the child, injuring the
child. Based on the distance between the automobile and the child, and on
expert testimony about the stopping distance at the speed at which Driver
was driving, Driver could have avoided striking the child by applying the
brakes immediately upon seeing the child. Assuming Driver breached a
standard of care and was therefore negligent in his failure to apply the
brakes after seeing the child in the street, was Driver's negligence the cause
of the child's injury?
Ordinarily, the question would be answered by a jury's determination as
to whether the injury would not have happened "but for" the negligent
failure to apply the brakes. On the facts given, a jury would likely decide
that the driver's negligence caused the injury. Consider, however, what
would happen if the definition of "cause" were structured quite differently,
to exclude as causes everything except physical forces, thus excluding
human actions or human failures to act. The reasoning might go as follows:
(1) "Causation" by definition excludes all causes except
physical forces (even when a human act, such as failure to
apply brakes, has contributed to a physical force such as
that of a car hitting a child, the cause, by definition, will be
simply the physical force); 2 9
(2) This exclusion rules out human actions as causes;
(3) This exclusion ensures that the question of the cause of an
injury will be answered without reference to human
responsibility and solely based on a chain of physical
forces;
129. Although such a definition sounds far-fetched to those trained in traditional tort law,
it is curiously similar to the reasoning of the protagonist in Camus's The Stranger. ALBERT
CAMUS, THE STRANGER 55-57 (Everyman's Library ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1993) (1942). On
trial for murder, and being asked his motive for shooting and killing a man, he could think of
no reason other than that "it was because of the sun." Id. at 98. In narrating the details of
the killing, the protagonist described in detail how the intensity of the sun and the glaring
light on a hot beach had propelled him forward into a totally unnecessary confrontation with
the man whom he shot. Id. at 55-57. In the world of this protagonist, the sun would be just
as meaningful (or meaningless) as any other explanation for the killing. In such a mode of
thinking, an entire set of causes (such as human wrongdoing) could be arbitrarily excluded
from consideration, and responsibility could be assigned to something as absurd as the sun.
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(4) Thus, the driver's act of failing to apply brakes is logically
not a "cause" of the child's being struck by the car and the
driver is not responsible.
Judge Aldisert describes "Begging the Question" (also known as "Petitio
Principii") in his discussion of logical fallacies as follows:
This fallacy is really a first-class rascal because it sneaks up on
us so often. It is a species of question-begging that assumes as
true what is to be proved. It is to assume the truth of what one
seeks to prove in the effort to prove it. The rascal bears many
names, petitio principii, arguing in a circle, circular reasoning,
putting the bunny in the hat, failing to prove the original
proposition asserted and using the original premise as proof of
itself.3 °
If indeed the theory of naturalistic evolution has tolerated a logical fallacy
at its root, then the traditional canons of logic should be brought to bear on
that theory in order to expose the fallacy. If the exclusion of intelligent
design from the definition of "science" is a species of begging the question,
then there is an error that must be corrected.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that intelligent design's analysis
conforms to time-tested, logical methods for analyzing causation. The
barrier typically interposed to the teaching of intelligent design is that it
allows for consideration of supernatural causes. However, because the
mere allowance for intelligent supernatural causes does not compromise the
strength and integrity of its method, there is no sound reason to exclude
intelligent design from the teaching of science.
In the inquiry into origins of life, intelligent design theory should be
granted an equal footing with naturalistic evolution and allowed to proceed
on its own merits. A jury in a tort case is permitted to consider all possible
causes before drawing an inference of causation and rendering its verdict.
Students of natural science should be permitted to consider all possible
causes of the existence of living organisms before making inferences as to
the cause of their existence.
If the scientific community excludes a valid and helpful form of analysis
from its work, that form of analysis and its benefits are lost to the scientific
community and to the culture generally. It would breathe life into our
130. ALDISERT, supra note 90, at 208.
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culture to recognize intelligent design as a valid and helpful method of
analysis and to permit it to flourish.
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